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Abstract

We present storage integrity concepts developed for the CubeSat MOVE-II over the past two years, enabling
dependable computing without relying solely upon hardened special purpose hardware. Neither component level,
nor hardware- or software-side measures individually can guarantee sufficient system consistency with modern
highly scaled components. Instead, a combination of hardware and software measures can drastically increase
system dependability, even for missions with a very long duration. Dependability in the most basic sense can
only be assured if program code and required supplementary data can be stored consistently and reliably aboard
a spacecraft. Thus, to enable any form of meaningful dependable computing, storage integrity must be assured
first and foremost. We present three software-driven concepts to assure storage consistency, each specifically
designed towards protecting key components: a system for volatile memory protection, the filesystem FTRFS to
protect system software, and MTD-mirror to safeguard payload data. All described solutions can be applied to
on-board computer design in general and do not require systems to be specifically designed for them. Hence,
simplicity can be maintained, error sources minimized, testability enhanced, and survival rates of miniaturized
satellite increased drastically.

I. I NTRODUCTION

error detection and correction (EDAC) becomes increasingly less effective if applied to modern highdensity electronics due to diminishing returns with fine
structural widths. As a result of these concepts’ limited
applicability, nanosatellite design is challenged by ever
increasing long-term dependability requirements.
Neither component level, nor hardware or software
measures alone can guarantee sufficient system consistency. However, hybrid solutions can increase reliability drastically introducing negligible or no additional
complexity. Software driven fault detection, isolation
and recovery from (hardware) errors (FDIR) is a
proven approach also within space-borne computing,
though it is seldom implemented on nanosatellites. A
broad variety of measures capable of enhancing or enabling FDIR for on-board electronics exists, especially
for data storage. Combined hard- and software measures can drastically increase system dependability.
The authors are involved in developing the
nanosatellite MOVE-II based upon an ARM-Cortex
processor as a platform for scientific payloads. Hence,
we designed MOVE-II’s on-board computer (OBC) to
guarantee data integrity using software side measures
and affordable standard hardware where necessary,
as traditional approaches for achieving dependability
do not suffice for such a system. After a detailed
evaluation of potential OSs for use aboard MOVEII, we chose the Linux kernel due to its adaptability,
extensive soft-/hardware support and vast community.
We decided against utilizing RTEMS mainly due to our
limited software development manpower, the intended
application aboard our nanosatellite MOVE-II, and the
abundant compute power of recent OBCs.
Often, dependability aboard spacecraft is only assured for processing components, while the integrity of
program code is neglected. In the next section, we thus
outline the importance of memory integrity as a foundation for dependable computing and provide a view

Recent miniaturized satellite development shows a
rapid increase in available compute performance and
storage capacity, but also in system complexity. CubeSats have proven to be both versatile and efficient for
various use-cases, thus have also become platforms for
an increasing variety of scientific payloads and even
commercial applications. Such satellites also require
an increased level of dependability in all subsystems
compared to educational satellites, due to prolonged
mission duration and computing burden. Nanosatellite
computing will therefore evolve away from federated
clusters of microcontrollers towards more powerful,
general purpose computers; a development that could
also be observed with larger spacecraft in the past.
Certainly, an increased computing burden also requires
more sophisticated operating system (OS) or software, making software-reuse a crucial aspect in future
nanosatellite design. In commercial and agency spaceflight, a concentration on few major OSs (e.g. RTEMS
[1]) and processors (e.g. LEON3 and RAD750) has
therefore occurred. A similar evolution, albeit much
faster, can also be observed for miniaturized satellites.
To satisfy scientific and commercial objectives,
miniaturized satellites will also require increased
data storage capacity for scientific data. Thus, many
such satellites have begun fielding a small but
integrity-critical core system storage for software,
and a dedicated mass-memory for pre-processing and
caching payload-generated data. Unfortunately, traditional hardware-centered approaches to achieving dependability of these components, especially radiationhardening, can also drastically increase costs, weight,
complexity and energy consumption while decreasing
overall performance. Therefore, such solutions (shielding, simple- and triple-modular-redundancy – TMR)
are often infeasible for miniaturized satellite design
and unsuitable for nanosatellites. Also, hardware-based
Fuchs
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on the topic at the grand scale. To protect data stored in
volatile memory, we present a minimalist yet efficient
approach to combine error scrubbing, blacklisting, and
error correction encoded (ECC) memory in Section III.
MOVE-II will utilize magneto-resistive random access
memory (MRAM) [2] as firmware storage, hence, we
developed a POSIX-compatible filesystem (FS) offering memory protection, checksumming and forward
error correction. This FS is being presented in Section
IV, can efficiently protect an OS- or firmware image
and supports hardware acceleration. Finally, a high
performance dependable storage concept combining
block-level redundancy and composite erasure coding
for highly scaled flash memory was implemented to
assure payload data integrity, the resulting concept is
outlined in Section V.
II. M EMORY I NTEGRITY AS A BASE
D EPENDABILITY

flux increase results in a rapid growth of bit errors
and other upsets in a satellite’s OBC. In the case
of MOVE-II, the full functionality of the commandand-data-handling subsystem, thus also its OBC, is
required at all time due to scientific measurements
being conducted from one of the satellite’s possible
payloads, even though planned maintenance outages
(e.g. reboots) are acceptable. This scientific payload
should measure the anti-proton flux within the SAA,
whose properties are subject of scientific debate.
Currently, dependable computing on satellites is
based mainly upon radiation tolerant special purpose
hardware, as the cost of space electronics and software
is usually dwarfed by a satellite’s launch, testing
and validation costs. Such components usually are
significantly more expensive than commercial off-theshelf (COTS) hardware. In part, this can be attributed
to a thorough selection process performed for such
components, but pricing is designed for aerospace and
spaceflight applications equipped with vast budgets
for long-term projects. Also, these components usually require more energy, but offer comparably little
compute power due to decreased clock frequencies
and smaller caches. These drawbacks mainly originate
from a primary reliance upon increased structural
width of the silicon, besides more resilient manufacturing techniques and materials. For miniaturized satellite
use, especially in nanosatellites, the prices commonly
charged for such components are prohibitively high,
often making their use entirely infeasible.
Regardless if hardened processing components can
be utilized, an OBC must compensate for radiation
induced displacement damage, latch-up and indirect
event effects which can not be mitigated technologically. Therefore, both soft- and hardware must be
designed to handle these issues, not if, but when they
occur. However, this fact has been largely ignored

FOR

The increasing professionalization, prolonged mission durations, and a broader spectrum of scientific
and commercial applications have resulted in many
different proprietary on-board computer concepts for
miniaturized satellites. Therefore, miniaturized satellite development has not only seen a rapid increase
in available compute power and storage capacity, but
also in system complexity. However, while system
sophistication has continuously increased, re-usability,
dependability, and reliability remained quite low [3].
Recent studies of all previously launched CubeSats
show an overall launch success rate of only 40% [4].
Such low reliability rates are unacceptable for missions
with more refined or long-term objectives, especially
with commercial interests involved. As nanosatellites
mostly consist of electronics, connected to and controlled by the OBC, achieving an elevated level of
system dependability must begin with this component.
Besides extreme temperature variations and the absence of atmosphere for heat dissipation, the impact
of the near-Earth radiation environment are crucial in
space computing and system design. About 20% of all
detected anomalies aboard satellites can be attributed
to high-energy particles from the various sources,
also in OBC-related components [5], [3]. Depending
on the orbit of the spacecraft and the occurrence
of solar particle events, its on-board computer will
be penetrated by a mixture of high-energy protons,
electrons and heavy ions. Physical shielding using aluminum or other material can reduce certain radiation
effects. However, sufficient protection would require
unreasonable additional mass for shielding.
In Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the radiation bombardment will be increased while transiting the South
Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) [6]. Earth’s magnetic field
experiences a local, height-dependent dip within the
SAA, due to an offset of the spin axis from the
magnetic axis. In this zone, a satellite and its electronics will experience an increase of proton flux
of up to 104 times (energies > 30 MeV) [7]. This
Fuchs

Fig. 1. A satellite’s memory hierarchy including input/output
functionality (depicted in white) and the processor. Data transiting
or stored within elements shown in yellow may be corrupted
arbitrarily. Components depicted in blue must be safeguarded against
corruption, i.e. using the concepts presented within this paper.
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especially in nanosatellite design, resulting in comparably cheap energy efficient federated OBC concepts
based upon highly fragile clusters of microcontrollers.
This aspect certainly is undergoing a fundamental shift
also due to externally induced mission requirements
and an increasing level of professionalization [8].
Dependability in the most basic sense can only be
assured if program code and required supplementary
data can be stored consistently and reliably aboard a
spacecraft. Thus, to enable any form of meaningful dependable computing, storage integrity must be assured
first and foremost. In the future, new manufacturing
techniques such as FD-SOI [9] will enable relatively
radiation-tolerant, cheap application processors of-theshelf [10], reinforcing the need for dependable data
storage solutions. Therefore, this research was motivated by finding solutions to assure dependability
without fully relying on rad-hard processors and TMR.
Different storage technologies vary regarding the
energy-threshold necessary to induce an effect and the
severity of its consequences. Various types of Single
Event Effects (SEEs), the destructive ones being the
most relevant, are well described in [11]. Some novel
memory technologies (e.g. MRAM [2], PCM [12])
have shown inherent radiation tolerance against bitflips, Single Event Upsets (SEUs), due to their data
storage mechanism [13], [14]. Due to a shifting voltage
threshold in floating gate cells caused by the total ionizing dose, flash memories become more susceptible
to bit errors the higher they are scaled. Highly scaled
flash memories are more prone to SEUs causing shifts
in the threshold voltage profile of one or more storage
cells as well [15]. All these memory technologies are
sensitive to Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs)
[16], which can affect blocks, banks or entire circuits
due to particle strikes in the peripheral circuitry.
To enable meaningful dependable computing, data
consistency must be assured both within volatile and
non-volatile memory, see Figure 1. Data is usually
classified as either system data or payload data stored
in volatile or non-volatile memory. The storage capacity required for system data may vary from few
kilobytes (firmware images stored within a microcontroller) to several megabytes (an OS kernel, its
and accompanying software). Very large OS installations and applications are highly uncommon aboard
spacecraft and thus not considered in this paper. Payload data storage on the other hand requires much
larger memory capacities ranging from several hundred
megabytes to many terabytes depending on the spacecraft’s mission, downlink bandwidth or link budget,
and mission duration. In addition, data and code will
temporarily reside in volatile system memory and of
course the relevant memories within controllers and
processors (i.e. caches and registers) which again must
satisfy entirely different requirements to performance
and size. Due to these varying requirements, different
memory technologies have become popular for system data storage, payload data storage and volatile
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memory. In the following sections, we will discuss
and develop protective concepts to ensure dependable
data storage aboard spacecraft with a special focus on
our nanosatellite use-case. All these concepts can be
implemented at least as efficiently to larger satellites,
as size and energy restrictions are much less pressing
aboard these vessels.
III. VOLATILE M EMORY C ONSISTENCY
Inevitably, data stored will at least temporarily reside within an OBC’s volatile memory and all current widely used memory technologies (e.g. SRAM,
SDRAM) are prone to radiation effects [17]. As a
straightforwards solution, some OBCs were built to
utilize only (non-volatile) MRAM as system memory
which is inherently immune to SEUs and therefore
allows OBC engineers to bypass additional integrity
assurance guarantees for RAM. However, MRAM
currently can not be scaled to capacities large enough
to accommodate more complex OSs. Thus, while
small satellites and very simple nanosatellites often
utilize custom firmware optimized for very low RAM
usage, larger spacecraft as well as most current and
future nanosatellites do rely upon SRAM, DRAM
or SDRAM. For simplicity, we will refer to these
technologies as RAM within this section. However, it
is not to be confused with the use of the term RAM
in Sections IV and Vof this paper, as in MRAM.
Radiation induced errors alongside device failover
is often assured using error correcting codes (ECC),
which have been in use in space engineering for
decades. However, a miniaturized satellite’s OS must
take an active role in volatile memory integrity assurance by reacting to ECC errors and testing the relevant
memory areas for permanent faults. To avoid accumulating errors over time in less frequently accessed
memory, an OS must periodically perform scrubbing.
In case of permanent errors, software should cease
utilizing such memory segments for future computation and blacklist them to reduce the strain on the

Fig. 2. Integrity of volatile memory can be guaranteed if memory checking (yellow), ECC and page-wise blacklisting (blue) are
combined. Scrubbing must be performed periodically to avoid
accumulating errors in rarely used code or data.
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used erasure code. Assuming these FDIR measures are
implemented, a consistency regime based on memory
validation, error scrubbing and blacklisting as depicted
in Figure 2 can be established.

B. A Memory Consistency Assurance Concept
When utilizing ECC, memory consistency is only
assured at access time, unless specialized self-checking
RAM concepts are applied in hardware [23], [24].
Rarely used data and code residing within memory
will over time accumulate errors without the OS being
aware of this fact, unless scrubbing is performed regularly to detect and correct bit-errors before they can
accumulate. The scrubbing frequency must be chosen
based on the amount of memory attached to the OBC,
the expected system load and the duration required
for one full scrubbing-run [25]. Resource conserving
scrubbing intervals for common memory sizes aboard
nanosatellites range from several minutes up to an
hour. Also, if a spacecraft were to pass through a
region of space with elevated radiation levels (e.g. the
SAA), scrubbing should be performed directly before
and after passing through such regions.

A. Memory Corruption and Countermeasures
The threat scenario for RAM mainly includes two
types of gradually accumulating errors: soft-errors (bitrot) and permanent hard errors. Depending on the
amount of data residing in RAM, even few hard errors
can cripple an on-board computer: the likelihood for
the corruption of critical instructions increases drastically over time. Soft errors occur on the Earth as well
as in orbit, due to electrical effects and highly charged
particles originating from beyond our solar system. In
case of such an error, data is corrupted temporarily
but, and once the relevant memory has been re-written,
consistency can be re-established. The likelihood of
these events on the ground is usually negligible as the
Earth’s magnetic field and the atmosphere provide significant protection from these events, thus very weak
or no erasure coding is utilized. Hard errors generally
occur due to manufacturing flaws, ESD, thermal- and
aging effects. Thus, they may also occur or surface
during an ongoing mission, further information on the
causes for hard-faults in RAM is described in detail
in [18]. Highly charged particles impacting the silicon
of RAM chips can also permanently damage circuitry.
Therefore, to compensate for both hard and soft errors,
ECC should be introduced [19].
By utilizing ECC-RAM integrity of the memory can
be assured starting at boot-up, though in contrast to
other approaches ECC can not efficiently be applied
in software [20]. Due to the high performance requirements towards RAM, weak but fast erasure codes such
as single error correction Hamming codes with a word
length of 8 bits are used [21], [22]. ECC modules
for space-use usually offer two or more bit-errors-perword correction. These codes require additional storage space, thereby reducing available net memory, and
increase access latency due to the higher computational
burden. Single-bit error correcting EDAC ASICs are
available off-the-shelf at minimal cost, whereas multibit error correcting ones are somewhat less common
and drastically more expensive. While such economical aspects are usually less pressing for miniaturized
satellites beyond the 10kg range, nanosatellite budgets
usually are much more constrained prompting for alternative, lightweight low-budget-compatible solutions.
Below, we thus present a software driven approach
to achieve a high level of RAM integrity without
expensive and comparably slow space-grade multi-biterror correcting ECC modules. Ultimately, stronger
ECC for RAM is not a satisfying final solution to RAM
consistency requirements due to inherent weaknesses
of this approach during prolonged operation.
Fuchs

Scrubbing tasks can be implemented in software
within the OS’s kernel, but could be initiated by a
userland application as well. In the case of a Linux
Kernel and a GNU userland, a scrubbing task can
most conveniently be implemented as a cron-job
reading the OBC’s physical memory. For this purpose,
the device node /dev/mem is offered by the Linux
Kernel as a character device. /dev/mem allows access
to physical memory where scrubbing must begin at
the device specific SDRAM base address to which
the RAM is mapped. Technically, even common Unix
programs like dd(1) could perform this task without
requiring custom written application software.
Another possibility would be to implement a Linux
kernel module using system timers to perform the
same task directly within kernel space. In this case, the
scrubbing-module could also directly react to detected
faults by manipulating page table mappings or initiating further checks to assure consistency. Execution
within kernel mode would also increase scrubbing
speed, allowing more precise and reliable timing.

Fig. 3. With single-bit correcting ECC-RAM, a word should no
longer be used once a single hard-fault has been detected. Hard
faults are depicted in black, soft faults in yellow, erasure code parity
in green.
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multi-bit-error correcting equivalent protection without
requiring costly specialized hardware, while increasing
system performance on strongly degraded systems.

C. Memory Checking and Blacklisting
Unless very strong multi-bit-error correcting ECC
(> 2 bit error correction) and scrubbing are utilized,
ECC can not sufficiently protect a spacecraft’s RAM
due to in-word-collisions of soft- and hard errors
as depicted in Figure 3. To avoid such collisions,
memory words containing hard faults should no longer
be utilized, as any further bit-flip would make the
word non-recoverable [26]. Even when using multibit ECC, memory should be blacklisted in case of
grouped permanent defects which may be induced due
to radiation effects or manufacturing flaws as well.
Memory must also be validated upon allocation
before being issued to a process. Validation can be
implemented either in hardware or software, with the
hardware variant offering superior testing performance
over the software approach. However, memory testing in hardware requires complex logic and circuitry,
whereas the software variant can be kept extremely
simple. The Linux kernel offers the possibility to perform these steps within the memory management subsystem for newly allocated pages for ia32 processors
already, and are currently porting this functionality
to the ARMv7 MMU-code. In case the Linux kernel
detects a fault in memory, the affected memory page
is reserved, thereby blacklisted from future use, and
another validated and healthy page is issued to the
process. Therefore, we chose to rely upon this proven
and much simpler software-side approach.
The ia32 implementation does not retain this list
of blacklisted memory regions beyond a restart of the
OS, though doing so is an important feature for use
aboard a satellite. As memory checking takes place at
a very low kernel-level (MMU code essentially works
on registers directly and in part must be written in
assembly), textual logging is impossible and persistent
storage would have to be realized in hardware. An
external logging facility implemented at this level
would entail rather complex and thus slow and error
prone logic, thus, a logging based implementation is
infeasible. However, at this stage we can still utilize
other functionality of the memory management subsystem to access directly mapped non-volatile RAM, in
which we can retain this information beyond a reboot.
Due to the small size required to store a page bitmap, it
can be stored within a small dedicated MRAM module,
read by the bootloader and passed on to the kernel
upon startup. This implementation can thus enable

IV. FTRFS: A FAULT-T OLERANT
R ADIATION -ROBUST F ILESYSTEM FOR S PACE U SE
While MRAM can not yet offer the capacity necessary for payload data, it is an excellent choice for
storing OS data due to its SEU immunity. However,
even then the OBC is still prone to SEFIs, stray-writes,
processor- and controller errors as well as in-transit
data corruption. FTRFS (fault-tolerant radiation-robust
filesystem for space use) was designed for small
volumes (≤4MB), but can also manage significantly
larger volumes up to several gigabytes in size (depending on the data block size). Erasure coding is
applied to protect against in-transit data corruption
and stray-writes within memory pages, which can not
be prevented using memory protection. Cyclic redundancy checksums (specifically CRC32) are utilized
for performance reasons in tandem with the ReedSolomon (RS) erasure code [27]. Even though CRC16
could be considered sufficient for most common block
sizes, we utilize a 32-bit checksum to further minimize
collision probability at a minimal compute overhead.
Most modern processors support memory protection, also for directly mapped memory such as
MRAM, thereby enable a powerful safeguard against
data corruption due to processor and controller faults.
However, memory protection has been largely ignored
in RAM-FS design, which, in part, can be attributed
to a misconception of memory protection as a pure
security measure. For directly mapped non-volatile
memory, memory protection introduces the memory
management unit as a safeguard against data corruption due to upsets in the system [28]. In a scenario
where MRAM is used, only in-use memory pages will
be writable even from kernel space, whereas the vast
majority of memory is kept read-only, protected from
misdirected write access i.e. due to SEUs in a register
used for addressing during a store operation.
As the volatile memory’s integrity can be assured
by the previously described functionality, we assume
ECC to be applied to CPU-caches, thus faults in these
deceives are considered detectable and possibly correctable at runtime. A computer running FTRFS must
be equipped with a memory management unit with
its page-table residing in integrity-assured memory to
enable run-time dynamic memory protection. All other

Fig. 4. The basic layout of FTRFS: EDAC data is appended or prepended to structures, depending on if a structure is of compile-time
fixed size or not. PSB and SSB denote the primary and secondary super blocks. The root inode is statically assumed to be the first inode.
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supported volume sizes are far beyond what current
miniaturized satellites can offer.
FSs for flash devices [34], [35] already handle
wear leveling2 and support device EDAC functionality
(checksumming, spare handling and recovery). However, these FSs require interaction with the memory
technology or the flash translation layer (FTL) 3 ,
thereby are incompatible with other memory technologies. This introduces further input/output-load and may
result in data corruption, and, as flash memory is block
based, these FSs would suffer similar drawbacks as a
pure error correcting block layer.
RAM FSs are usually optimized for throughput
or simplicity, but are usually designed for volatile
memory, thus do not even include nondestructive unmount procedures. Few RAM FSs for non-volatile
exist [36], [37], but none of these FSs are designed
with dependability in mind, albeit PRAMFS which
however so does not offer data integrity guarantees.
Thus, in the absence of a potentially reusable FS,
we decided to develop FTRFS based on a layout
similar to the simple and space conserving extended
2 (ext2) FS. Aligning FTRFS to this FS’s layout
enabled significant code reuse especially regarding
concurrency, locking and permission handling. We
adapted PRAMFS’s memory protection functionality
for FTRFS and introduced erasure coding.

elements (e.g. periphery and compute units), memories
(e.g. registers) and in-transit data in buffers are considered potential error sources. A loss of components
has to be compensated at the software- or hardware
level through voting or simple redundancy. Multidevice capability was considered for this FS, however
it should rather be implemented below the FS level
[29] or as an overlay, e.g. RAIF [30].
A. Approach Outline and Alternatives
We consider an FS the most portable and efficient
approach to combine these features, as the resulting
solution should also be bootable while maintaining
flexible EDAC capabilities. RAM FSs are not block
based and benefit from the ability to access data arbitrarily. Data structures holding information about the
physical (e.g. inode count and volume size) or logical
(e.g. directory structure and permissions) FS layout
require relatively little space compared to file data.
In contrast to block-based erasure coding, FS level
measures enables stronger erasure coding for these
structures requiring minimal extra space. Also, blockbased coding would introduce abstraction, thereby additional code and complexity. A block-based approach
would also sacrificing the random access possibility
on MRAM, requiring more complicated locking. We
initially intended to utilize an existing FS instead
of implementing and maintaining one, and therefore
conducted an in-depth review of potential alternatives.
Silent data corruption has become a practical issue
with nowadays common many-terabyte sized volumes.
Therefore, next-generation FSs, e.g. BTRFS [31] and
ZFS [32], and some modern RAID 1 solutions [33]
can maintain checksums for data blocks and metadata,
but none of these FSs scale to small storage volumes. All of these FSs include throughput enhancing
functionality like caching and disk head tracking, to
optimize data access and utilize locality. However,
these enhancements do not apply to random-access
memories and add significant code overhead, thereby
reducing performance while at the same time making FS implementations more error prone. Minimum
1 Redundant

B. Metadata Integrity Protection
Efficient error detection and correction of meta
information and data was considered crucial during
development. The protective guarantees offered by the
FS can be adjusted at format time or later through the
use of external tools to the mission duration, destination and the orbit a spacecraft operates on. For proper
protection at the logical level, in addition to the stored
FS objects (inodes) and their data, all other information
must be protected as well. Thus, we borrow memory
protection from the wprotect component of PRAMFS.
Although the basic FS layout is inspired by ext2 data
addressing and bad block handling work fundamen2 keeping
3 The

Array of Independent Disks

all parts of a memory device at an evenly used, level
memory technology device subsystem (MTD) in Linux

Fig. 5. Each inode can either utilize direct addressing or double indirection for storing file data. An inode may possess extended attribute
and contains a reference to its parent directory. Each directory’s child inodes are kept within a double linked list maintained by the parent.
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Fig. 6. A 512B data block subdivided into 4 subblocks using example RS parameters. Checksums for the entire data block, EDAC data
and each subblock are depicted in yellow, FEC data in blue.

tally differently. The Super Block (SB) is kept redundantly, as depicted in Figure 4 and an update to the SB
always implies a refresh of the secondary SB. The SB
contains EDAC parameters for blocks, inodes and the
bitmap, and is static after volume creation. We avoid
accumulating errors over time through scrubbing and
trigger this functionality upon execution of certain FS
functionality (e.g. directory traversal). Using MRAM,
the FS does not suffer from radiation induced bit-rot
and errors thereby can only accumulate during usage,
additional time-triggered scrubbing during periods of
little or no volume access is unnecessary.
A block-usage bitmap is appended to the secondary
SB and allocated based on the overhead subtracted
data-block count. Thus, the protection data is located
in the first block after the end of the bitmap, see Figure
4. We refrain from re-computing and re-checking the
entire bitmap upon each access, as file allocation or
truncate related operations can imply up to hundreds
of consecutive alterations to the bitmap.
Inodes are kept as an array, each representing a file,
directory or other FS object. Their consistency is of
paramount importance as they define the logical structure of the FS. As each inode is an independent entity,
an inode-table wide FEC segment is unnecessary.
Most modern FSs utilize tree-based structures or
triple-indirection to organize data into blocks or extends (chunks of data extending over a given number of
blocks or size). These structures are comparably fragile
and space inefficient for small files, as a significant
base-amount of blocks must be set aside only for addressing (e.g. 1 block to hold the actual data, 3 blocks
for triple-indirection). To optimize the FS towards both
Data
Structure
Super Block
Inode
Bitmap
Data Blocks

Size (B)
128
160
1543
1024
1024

Correction
Symbols/Code
32
32
16
4
8

4096
4096

4
8

larger (e.g. a kernel image, a database) and very small
(e.g. scripts) files, direct data addressing and double
indirection are supported, as depicted in Figure 5.
Nanosatellites are not yet considered security critical
devices. However, the application area of nanosatellites
will expand considerably in the future and include
security critical applications [8]. An increasing professionalization will introduce enhanced requirements
regarding dependability and security. Shared-satellite
usage scenarios as well as technology testing satellites
will certainly also require stronger security measures,
which can be implemented using extended attributes
(xattrs). As xattr blocks contain various records and
different individual permissions, the block’s integrity
is verified once before an operation and it is updated
after all write access (in bulk) has been concluded.
xattrs are treated like data blocks but are deduplicated
and referenced directly within inodes.
C. Algorithm Details and Performance
There are numerous erasure codes available that
could be used to protect a full size-optimized Linux
root FS including a kernel image safely over a long
period of time. After careful consideration, ReedSolomon (RS) was chosen mainly due to the following:
• Cyclic block codes show excellent performance
for multi-bit error correction. RS is particularly
well analyzed, and widely used in various embedded scenarios, including spacecraft. Optimized
software implementations, IP-cores and ASICs
are available, guaranteeing universal availability.
• MRAM, while being SEU immune, is still prone
to stray-writes, controller errors and in-transit

# Codes
1
1
14
8
8

Correction
Total (B)
32
32
224
32
64

Overhead (B)
76
76
448
104
168

Overhead (%)
59.38%
47.50%
29.09%
10.16%
16.41%

32
128
392
9.57%
32
256
648
15.82%
TABLE I
EDAC OVERHEAD FOR DIFFERENT FS STRUCTURES . B ITMAP FOR : 16MB FS, 1024B BS WITH 8B CORRECTION CAPABILITY PER
128B DATA
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data corruption. Misdirected access within a page
evades memory protection and corrupts the FS,
thus grouped errors will occur. RS relies upon
symbol level error correction, which is precisely
the kind of corruption the FS must correct.
RS decoding becomes computationally more expensive with increasing symbol size, thus it is important to utilize small symbols while choosing large
enough symbols to enable reasonably long codes. The
protected data is subdivided into sub-blocks sized to
128B plus the user specified number of correctionroots using a comparably small symbol size of 8
bits. 8 bit sized symbols enable high-performance
RS decoding and byte-alignment simplifies addressing,
while Inodes and SBs fit into single RS-codes. To skip
the expensive RS decoding step during regular read
operations, data- and FEC integrity are verified using
CRC32 checksums. Data blocks (Figure 6) are divided
into subblocks so the FS can make optimal use of the
RS code length, while correction data is accumulated
at the end of the data block. For common block-sizes
and error correction strengths, 4 to 32 RS code words
are necessary, see Table I FS overhead.

concept specifically to handle highly scaled multi-level
cell NAND-flash according to the these requirements:
1) Efficient data storage on MLC flash memory.
2) Integrity protection and error correction strength
adjustable to varying mission parameters.
3) Effective handling of radiation effects on the
memory as well as the control logic.
4) Protection against device failure.
5) Low soft- and hardware complexity.
6) Universal FS and OS support.
We consider these requirements to be met best with
FTL-middleware, which is similar to a self contained
extension or a plugin. Therein, RAID-like features
and checksumming can be combined effectively with
a composite erasure coding system. We implemented
MTD-mirror as part of the MTD subsystem of the
Linux Kernel. By utilizing mirroring (RAID1) or distributed parity (RAID5/6) we can therefore protect
against device, block and page failure.
To handle permanent block defects, single event
functional interrupts, radiation induced programmatic
errors and logic related problems, we apply coarse
symbol level erasure coding. As outlined below, this
measure would be insufficient to compensate for radiation effects, silent data corruption and bit flips. The
solution is to be implemented within the FTL, therefore it can still be kept abstract and device independent
while it can also profit from hardware acceleration,
additionally providing enhanced diagnostics.

V. H IGH -P ERFORMANCE F LASH M EMORY
I NTEGRITY
To enable larger payload mass-storage, highly scaled
memory is required and NAND-flash (see Section
V-A) is currently the most popular technology to
fill this role. Even though flash may eventually be
replaced by (radiation tolerant) phase change memory
(PCM) in the long run, it is not yet available in highdensity versions. Thus we must focus our attention on
flash as the only viable mass storage technology, until
high-density PCM becomes available in the future.
For this memory type, software must compensate for
wear and various translation and abstraction layers,
making all-in-one solutions like FSs very complex and
error prone. Thus, more sophisticated EDAC concepts
are required, as simple redundancy, parity or erasure
coding are insufficient. A protective concept efficient
also for highly-scaled flash memory must therefore
be based upon the special properties of flash and its
architecture. Therefore the initial parts of this section
are dedicated to flash memory organization and an
analysis of why simple voting is insufficient in this
case. We used these results to construct an EDAC

A. Single- and Multi-Level Cell Flash
Each flash memory cell consists of a single field
effect transistor with an additional floating gate. Depending on the voltage applied between the gate’s
source and drain, electrons are pumped into or out
of the floating gate. A cell’s state is thus dependent
on whether or not a specific threshold voltage level is
exceeded. a cell can be read as programmed (0) if the
threshold is a exceeded, or erased (1), see Figure 7a.
A Single Level Cell Flash (SLC) cell can thereby
store one bit using one threshold. In an Multi Level
Cell (MLC) gate, additional thresholds are used to
differentiate between multiple values, see Figure 7b.
With 2n voltage levels and 2n − 1 thresholds, it is
possible to encode n bits, on the same piece of silicon,
MLC can thus allow a much higher packing density.
However, electrical complexity grows and the required

Fig. 7. The voltage reference and thresholds of SLC- (a) and MLC (b) cells. (c): Bit-flips for the value 00 due to leakage (01) and radiation
effects (10).
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read sensitivity and write specificity increases with the
number of bits represented.
As the voltage-delta between levels decreases, increased precision is required for sensing and chargeplacement, resulting in MLC memory being more
dependent on its cells’ ability to retain charge. A
state machine is required for addressing MLC memory
which in turn increases latency and adds considerable
overhead logic, as multiple addresses are not mapped
to one gate. This comparably complex state machine
may thus hang or introduce arbitrary delays with operations requiring multiple cycles and varying latency.
Environmental temperature variations change the
leakage current of the silicon, draining the floating gate
of both SLC and MLC flash over time [38]. Software,
e.g. the flash translation layer (FTL), must impose
appropriate countermeasures against these effects in
addition to high energy radiation related degradation.
MLC flash memories are also more susceptible to bit
errors than SLC [39] due to a shift voltage threshold
in floating gate cells caused by the total ionizing dose.
Also, highly scaled flash memories become increasingly prone to single event upsets (SEU) causing shifts
in the threshold voltage profile of cells, referred to as
multiple bit upsets [40]. A varying amount of data
will thereby be corrupted through one SEU for which
EDAC measures must be adapted, depending on the
number of bits represented within a cell [41]. Currently
widely used single-bit error correcting EDAC measures are thus insufficient to protect MLC consistency.
Data in flash memory can not read freely due to
the layout of the cell circuitry. NAND-flash memory
is organized in blocks and pages, in which cells are
connected as negated AND circuits, forming NANDgates. If connected as NOR gates, random-read-access
is possible at the cost of strongly increased wiring
and controller overhead is possible, curtailing so called
NOR-flash’s data storage density. Partial writes to flash
are impossible and the entire block’s previous content
must be read and updated in RAM, afterwards the
block can be erased (by draining the block’s cells’
voltage) and programmed anew. Hence, read and write
operations induce different timing behavior and make
access to MLC-flash much more complicated than to
SLC-NAND- or NOR-flash due to the addressing state
machine. With either technology, a flash FS and the
FTL must handle basic block FDIR as well as eraseblock and (for NAND-flash) read-page abstraction. A
flash FS must thus implement all functionality necessary to handle failure of memory blocks and pages
to extend memory life. It must perform block wear
leveling, read and erase block abstraction, bad-block
relocation and garbage collection to prevent premature
degradation and failure of pages and blocks. The FTL
can implement parts of this FDIR functionality for the
FS interfacing with hardware specific device drivers.
Over time, a flash memory bank will accumulate
fully defective blocks and utilize spare blocks to
compensate. Eventually, the pool of spares will be
Fuchs

depleted, in which case the FTL or FS will begin
recycling less defective blocks and compensate with
erasure coding only, thereby sacrificing performance
to a certain degree. Traditionally, erasure coding is
applied in software or by the controller to counter
defects due to wear and bit-flips due to charge leakage.
For simplicity, cyclic block codes with large symbol
sizes are utilized, though the latest generation of
solid-state-drive controllers has begun employing more
sophisticated codes. For space use, the symbol size is
reduced to support one or two bit correcting erasure
coding, as corruption will mostly result from radiation
effects. However, block EDAC becomes inefficient due
to the occurrence of grouped errors and SEUs affecting
multiple cells in highly scaled memory [42].
B. Alternative Approaches
While voting and triple-modular-redundancy are
technically still possible for MLC-flash, it is severely
constrained by the additional circuitry, logic and
strongly varying timing behavior. Voting would have
to be implemented for the addressing state machine
as well, otherwise it could stall the entire voting
circuit. However, due to the varying timing behavior of
NAND-flash and the more complex logic, the resulting
voter-circuit would thus become more error prone,
require more energy and reduce overall performance.
Like with FTRFS, the outlined requirements could
also be met using a flash FS. UFFS particularly would
be a prime candidate to be extended to handle multiple
memory devices and enhanced EDAC, however, the
resulting all-in-one FS would be complex and error
prone. Device independence could also be added on
top of regular flash FS as a separate layer of software
[30], see Figure 8. Within a RAIF set, increased protective requirements could be satisfied with additional
redundant copies of the FS content. The underlying
individual FSs would then have to handle all EDAC
functionality, as RAIF by itself does not offer any
integrity guarantees beyond FS or file failure.

Fig. 8. Memory access hierarchy for a RAIF based system with
added error correction. Extensive modifications to various components are be required; affected elements are depicted in yellow.
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RAIF sets, however, are prone to FS-metadata corruption which can result in single block errors failing
an entire FS, as RAIF only reads from underlying FSs.
Files damaged across all of a RAIF set’s FSs would
become unrecoverable and would forward a defective
copy to the application, instead of combining multiple
damaged copies into a correct one. RAIF therefore
actively inhibits error correction and may even cripple
recovery of larger files. While RAIF could be adapted
to this issue, the resulting storage architecture would
again become highly complex, difficult to validate and
debug. As RAIF implements simple FS redundancy, its
storage efficiency will always be lacking compared to
distributed parity concepts. Being a pure software layer
without the possibility to interact with the devices,
hardware acceleration of RAIF would be impossible.
RAID can be applied efficiently to space-borne
storage architectures and has been used previously
aboard spacecraft (e.g. in the GAIA mission), in contrast to RAIF [43]. These architectures, however, were
designed for SLC (see Section V) and only relied
on RAID to achieve device fail-over through data
mirroring (RAID1) and distributed parity (RAID5/6)
[44], [43]. However, they usually rely upon the block
level hardware error correction provided by the flash
memory or controller or implement simple parity only.
The different distribution of bit-errors on MLC flash,
can not be addressed using these concepts and coarse
symbol based erasure coding is insufficient.

an FTL middleware module.
The functional layout of MTD-mirror’s block consistency protection is depicted in Figure 10 and is
based upon a serial concatenated (composite) erasure
code system. Like in FTRFS, a data checksum allows
bypassing decoding of intact data. The second checksum is used to prevent symbol drift of the erasure
coding layers. The first erasure coding layer is based
on relatively coarse symbols and protects against data
corruption induced by stray writes, controller issues
and multi-bit errors similar to FTRFS, due to which
RS [45] was selected as well.
Erasure coding with coarse symbols is efficient if
symbols are largely or entirely corrupted, but shows
weak performance when compensating radiationinduced bit-rot. SEUs statistically will equally degrade
all data of a code word, corrupting multiple code
symbols with comparably few bit errors, due to which
previous storage concepts often relied upon convolution codes. However, as error-models become more
complex (2 or more bit-errors in MLC), convolution
code complexity increases, and storage efficiency diminishes. To handle single or double bit-flips within
individual code symbols of the first level RS code,
a second level of erasure coding using Low-Density
Parity Check Codes (LDPC) [46] was added. LDPC
is efficient with very small symbol sizes (1 or two
bit), allows high-speed iterative decoding [47] and
offers superior performance compared to convolution
codes [48]. LCPC supports recovery of slightly corrupted RS-symbols and parity, but due to more costly
decoding is only being used in case RS fails for
repairing individual damaged symbols. This runtime
behavior can thereby drastically increase recovery rates
on radiation-degraded memories. The set can also
attempt repair using data from different blocks in the
hope of obtaining a consistent combination of blockdata, as multiple copies of the erasure code parity data
and checksums are available.
We chose to apply the two FEC layers in order
(Figure 10) as hardware-acceleration of RS is readily
available to us. Hence, the sequence should be determined based on the available acceleration possibilities
and mission parameters. If severe bit-rot is expected
or higher order density MLC is used, the LDPC-layer
should be applied prior to RS decoding.

C. The MTD-Mirror Middleware Layer
RAID-like functionality could be implemented as a
middleware within the FTL as depicted in Figure 9,
thus the software can interact both with the FS and
the rest of the FTL, without requiring alterations to
either. Such middleware can remain pervious to FS
operations and allows device failure protection to be
combined with enhanced erasure coding as RAID can
therein be implemented with comparably little effort.
Validation, testing and analysis can thus be simplified
as all implementation work can be concentrated into

D. Optimization & Future Work
While the logic required to implement this storage
solution is relatively simple, more advanced distributed
parity RAID concepts offer increased mass/cost/energy
efficiency due to overhead reduction. There has been
prior research on adding checksumming support to
RAID5 in [44], [43], though utilizing RAID5 directly
would introduce issues. Error correction information
in RAID5C [44] can either be stored redundantly with
each block, introducing unnecessary overhead, or as
single copy within the parity-block. While this would
increase the net storage capacity, a single point of

Fig. 9. Memory access and data flow hierarchy for an MTDMirror set. Flash-memory specific logic is depicted in blue and may
partially reside within the FTL. Required modifications are indicated
in yellow.
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Fig. 10. The simplified layout of an MTD-mirror write-block without to read-page indication. Added erasure code correction information
is depicted in yellow, checksums in blue.

failure would be introduced for each block group.
If the parity block was lost, the integrity of data
which was protected by this block could no longer
be verified. Instead, RAID5 can be applied to data
and error correction information independently, only
requiring one extra checksum to be stored per block.
RAID6, however, can be implemented almost asis, with error correction data and checksums being
stored directly on the two or more parity blocks
associated with each group. There are also promising
concepts for utilizing erasure coding for generating
parity blocks by themselves, thereby obsoleting simple
hamming-distance based parity coding [49], [50]. Further research on this topic is required and may enable
optimization for flash memory and radiation aspects
similar to the ones described in this paper.

The high level architecture of MTD-mirror has
been implemented for RAID1, though we have begun
working towards enabling more advanced distributed
parity concepts. The concept originally begun as a
spin-off from FTRFS using a fault-tolerant block layer
for more complex memory than MRAM. MTD-mirror
therefore also serves as a showcase for how innovative concepts developed for miniaturized satellites
can influence commercial and agency space flight:
the concept’s design was in part influenced by the
payload data storage requirements of the JUICE and
Euclid missions. A related paper on how the MTDmirror layer can be adapted to very large storage
volumes common to these missions was published
at DASIA2015 [52], which however is not intended
directly for nanosatellite use. FTLs like Linux-MTD
exist for most modern OSs or are built into the base
kernel for those supporting flash memory directly.
Besides API adaptions to MTD-mirror, little additional
work is required for porting it to other OSs.

VI. R ESULTS AND C URRENT S TATUS
For testing our volatile memory protection system,
we are currently using the memcheck functionality
within a virtualized ia32-demonstrator. Once the memcheck port for ARM has been completed, we will
switch the demonstrator to the ARMv7 architecture
and can thereby re-use the existing setup for testing
and debugging.
FTRFS is currently undergoing testing and has
been implemented using the RS implementation of
the Linux kernel, as its API also supports hardware
acceleration. Due to its POSIX-compliance, the FS
could easily be ported to other platforms. An in-depth
description and analysis of FTRFS has been published
as part of the computer science conference ARCS2015
proceedings [51]. While the FS has been tested and
logically validated, the code should be optimized
which will result in a drastic performance increase.
The FS’s overall performance depends strongly upon
the utilized hardware, as synthetic benchmarks are
not representative for different OBC implementations.
An in-depth analysis will be conducted once a feature complete OBC implementation for MOVE-II is
available. Data degradation during metering will be
introduced using fault injection. However, artificial
fault injection is usually not considered sufficient to
prove the efficiency of a fault-tolerance concept for
space-use. An identical test-model of our satellite’s
OBC including the FS will undergo testing using
various radiation sources before launch. Results will be
made available once these tests have been conducted.
Fuchs

VII. C ONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented three software-driven
concepts to assure storage consistency, each specifically designed towards protecting key components:
a system for volatile memory protection, FTRFS to
protect firmware or OS images and MTD-mirror to
safeguard payload data. All outlined solutions can
be applied to different OBC designs and do not require the OBC to be specifically designed for them.
They can be used universally in miniaturized satellite
architectures for both long and short-term missions,
thereby laying the foundation to increased system
dependability. In contrast to earlier concepts, none of
the approaches requires or enforces design-time fixed
protection parameters. Both can be implemented either
completely in software, or as hardware accelerated
hybrids. The protective guarantees offered are fully
run-time configurable.
Assuring integrity of core system storage up to a
size of several gigabytes, FTRFS enables a softwareside protective scheme against data degradation.
Thereby, we have demonstrated the feasibility of a
simple bootable, POSIX-compatible FS which can
efficiently protect a full OS image. The MTD-mirror
middleware enables reliable high-performance MLCNAND-flash usage with a minimal set of software
and logic. MTD-mirror is independent of the partic11
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ular memory devices and can be entirely based on
nanosatellite-compatible flash chips by utilizing FEC
enabled RAID1 and checksumming.
Neither traditional hardware nor pure software measures individually can guarantee sufficiently strong
system consistency for long-term missions. Traditionally, stronger EDAC and component-redundancy are
used to compensate for radiation effects in space
systems, which does not scale for complex systems
and results in increased energy consumption. While
redundancy and hardware-side voting can protect well
from device failure, data integrity protection is difficult
at this level. A combination of hardware and software
measures, as outlined in this paper, can thus drastically increase system dependability, even for missions
with a very long duration. Thereby, simplicity can be
maintained, error sources minimized, testability can be
increased and throughput maximized.
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